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There is a curious paradox in scholarly understandings of counsel during the Tudor period. On 
the one hand, political counsel is widely recognised to have been one of the central, if not the 
central, political concern of the Tudor period, as evidenced by its significance in texts such as 
More’s Utopia, Elyot’s Boke Called the Governor, Bacon’s Essays and so on.1 On the other 
hand, the two longest-reigning and best-known monarchs of the period, Henry VIII and 
Elizabeth I, have a reputation – then and now – for being notoriously difficult to counsel, for 
refusing advice or being offended by the presentation of it.2 To add further complexity, both 
Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth were products of a humanist education which stressed 
the importance of counsel to a monarch, and went to great lengths to appear as if they were 
recipients of educated advice.3 
Thus, teasing out the relationship between counsel and the Tudor crown is not easy, but 
it is essential to understanding both the way in which counsel influenced sovereignty in the 
early modern period as well as the political operations of the Tudor regime. This chapter will 
provide an outline of the discourse of counsel during the Tudor ‘monarchy of counsel’, before 
examining in particular the fundamental shift from a ‘humanist’ discourse of counsel in the 
early decades of the sixteenth century to a ‘Machiavellian’ discourse from the middle of the 
century.4 It will examine how this latter vocabulary became the foundation of the Reason of 
State tradition, which emphasises the prioritization the ‘interest’, of the state, often over more 
moral or religious considerations.5 These shifts are especially visible in the English, as opposed 
to European, context where the rule of a minor and two women in the second half of the 
sixteenth century shifted attention (and suspicion) onto the figure of the counsellor in a more 
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explicit way than on the continent. The bulk of the chapter will thus focus on the Elizabethan 
discourse of Reason of State and how it fundamentally changed political counsel in this period.  
 
I. Studying the English Discourse of Counsel  
The ‘discourse’, ‘problem’ and ‘paradox’ of counsel in England during the ‘monarchy of 
counsel’ (from the end of the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War) have received 
noteworthy attention of late, though significant gaps still exist in the literature. As John Watts 
has suggested, ‘much more attention has been given to the growth of central government, the 
functioning of clientage networks, the changing structures of political society and the securing 
of compliance’ than to counsel, but the study of the ‘problem of counsel’ has been revived in 
large part because of the generation of what John Guy has called the ‘new political history’ of 
Tudor England.6 Guy was the first to attempt a categorisation of two ‘vocabularies’ of the 
‘rhetoric of counsel’: ‘feudal-baronial’ and ‘humanist-classical’, noting especially how they 
arose under the reign of Henry VIII.7 Even more recently, attempts to understand the 
‘monarchy of counsel’ have been led by Jacqueline Rose, whose article on ‘Kingship and 
Counsel in Early Modern England’ added a third vocabulary to Guy’s two, an ‘exclusively 
religious’ language of counsel.8  
Work has also been done on counsel in particular Tudor regimes, though little has been 
done to compare and contrast across them. Perhaps the least explored is that of Henry VII, 
though work has been done on the changes he made to institutional councils during his reign, 
for instance by Peter Holmes, as well as Stephen Gunn, who has also drawn attention to the 
role of ‘new men’ within court and council.9 The complexities and brevity of Edwardian and 
Marian rule often mean that counsel is overlooked, though Stephen Alford has explored the 
theme in his Kingship and Politics in the Reign of Edward VI, and Joanne Paul has recently 
attempted to draw out some of the negotiations surrounding counsel in the reign of Mary I, 
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from under the shadow of her half-sister’s reign.10 These reigns are often passed over in favour 
of the more widely-studied Tudor monarchs: Henry VIII and Elizabeth I.  
 Studies of counsel under Henry VIII tend to focus on particular writings, such as those 
of Thomas More,11 Thomas Elyot,12 or Thomas Starkey.13 They often, too, isolate the role of 
councils, such as the Privy Council or parliament,14 or the roles of various fora for counsel, 
such as plays or poetry.15 Guy has especially noted the vocabularies and strategies of counsel 
in this period,16 and Richard Rex has shown how Henry VIII used counsel as a means to 
consensus following the break with Rome.17 The consensus is that humanism dominated 
Henrician expectations surrounding counsel-giving, which emphasised the virtue of both 
counsellor and monarch. 
 Commentary on counsel in the reign of the final Tudor monarch, Elizabeth I, contains 
far less consensus and remains more of a developing field than which examines her father’s 
reign. Generally, however, and as one might expect, it has focused on the issue of gender. Anne 
McLaren, in particular, has drawn attention to the way in which Elizabeth’s gender, combined 
with humanist expectations regarding counsel, generated the need for a strong mixed monarchy 
and ‘queen-in-parliament’ model of rule.18 Natalie Mears, contrastingly, focuses on the 
personal, rather than institutional, relationships and mechanisms of counsel,19 and recently 
Susan Doran has argued against the widely-held belief that Elizabeth and her counsellors were 
constantly at opposition, fighting over the reins of power.20 None of these accounts take 
seriously the context of Machiavellianism and the development of Reason of State under 
Elizabeth I.21 This chapter attempts to remedy this omission, by focusing on changes in 
discourse and vocabularies in the discourse of counsel in the Elizabethan period in comparison 
with those that had existed previously.  
 




By the early modern period, political counsel had been a part of European political thinking 
since its earliest days in ancient Greece and was an essential part of medieval political 
discourse.22 Medieval theory had placed the responsibility of giving counsel into the hands of 
the politically disengaged philosopher – Aristotle serving as the model23 – as well as the 
political right of the noble class, as a means of ensuring that they were given a voice in the 
decisions of the state.24 When this right was not respected, monarchs could be justifiably 
overthrown, as was the case with Richard II – Richard the ‘redeless’ (or adviceless) – in 
England in 1399.25 
With the spread of Renaissance humanism, philosopher was combined with courtier in 
crafting a new kind of counsellor who tempered truthful advice with an awareness of 
circumstance, as evidenced in Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier (1528). Such a 
courtier-counsellor ought to combine ‘knoweleage of the truth’ with ‘Courtliness’ so ‘In the 
wise maye he leade [the prince], throughe the toughe way of vertue (as it were) deckynge yt 
aout with boowes to shadowe yt and strawinge it over wyth sightlye flouers’.26 A similar 
sentiment is expressed in Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), through the character of Morus, who 
recommends an ‘indirect approach’ and a ‘more civil philosophy’ (philosophia ciuilior)27 ‘that 
takes its cue, adapts itself to the drama in hand and acts its part neatly and appropriately’ or 
‘cum decoro’.28 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, such a figure became the object of 
deep suspicion. The reason was the rise of Machiavellianism - a political perspective based on, 
though not always faithful to, the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, primarily The Prince 
(written 1513, published posthumously 1532). Machiavelli reversed the humanist model of 
counsel, in which the prince is ‘led’ or ‘instructed’ by the prudence of his counsellor(s), instead 
suggesting that the prince’s prudence determines the wisdom of his council.29 Rhetoric, the 
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tool of the humanist counsellor, was especially distrusted for its ability to ‘move’ or manipulate 
the emotions of the hearer, as in such a case, who truly ruled: prince or counsellor? For this 
reason, the middle of the century onwards saw an increase in the recommendation of books of 
history as counsellors (or counsellors who simply related the lessons of such books). Hence the 
popular maxim ‘the best counsellors are the dead’ for ‘the penne is of a more free condition 
then the tongue’.30  
In the later sixteenth century the rise of Reason of State literature, a phenomenon first 
described in print by Giovanni Botero in 1589, meant that the attention shifted to the 
‘observations’ of neighbouring states – their geographical positions, policies and ‘interests’ – 
with the aim of advancing one’s own state interest over that of the others.31 It was, in short, a 
far cry from the virtuous courtiers of the humanist tradition and begins to look much more like 
the realist political ‘science’ of the modern period. 
These tendencies were seen across Europe, but were especially felt in England where 
the discourse of counsel took on a particular importance.32 As has been noted, from the end of 
the Wars of Roses to the English Civil War, counsel was such a fundamental part of English 
political discourse that the regime has been identified as a ‘monarchy of counsel’.33 This is, of 
course, a contradiction in terms, as many throughout the sixteenth century realized, revealing 
the ‘paradox of counsel’ which defined relations between counsel and command in the period. 
If the counsellor, as in the humanist tradition, in fact knew better than the monarch, and led or 
governed him, then what was the role of a monarch at all? How could a monarch be truly said 
to be ruling? 
These questions were latent during the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII.34 The 
‘tragedy of counsel’ in this period encompassed not worries surrounding an overly-powerful 
counsellor, but rather increasing absolutism in the person of the monarch. Thus much of the 
literature struggled with how both to speak truth to a monarch (parrhesia) and keep one’s head; 
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a topic epitomized by both the writing and career of Thomas More, and known as the ‘problem 
of counsel’.  
It is with the death of Henry VIII and the reign of his son, Edward VI, that attention 
and power shifts clearly onto the figure of the counsellor in the English court, along with a 
substantial level of suspicion. Importantly this moment coincides with the growth in the 
Machiavellian conciliar discourse noted above. Machiavelli’s work circulated Europe, 
including in England, from the 1520s. In fact, of the small number of examples of articulated 
responses to Machiavelli in the first half of the sixteenth century, most address an English 
context, and the first attempts to apply his theories to political analysis were by English 
writers.35  
This convergence of changed political reality – a minor on the throne, who was 
followed by two women – with changes in political discourse drew further attention to the role 
of the counsellor, though seldom in a positive way. Both minors and women were considered 
to be more easily influenced by adult male counsellors (as they lacked the prudence and 
rationality to rule over their counsellors or know good counsel from bad).36 At the same time, 
the prevalence of Machiavellian thought increased the perception of counsellors as self-
interested Machiavels who would all too willingly take advantage of such inferior rulers.37   
 
III. Queen Elizabeth I and Reason of State 
 
It was not just Elizabeth’s gender which prompted significant changes to the means, content 
and significance of counsel during her reign, but also the confluence of factors, noted above, 
that dramatically altered the discourse of counsel in this period.38 Counsel in the reign of 
Elizabeth I became more ‘practical’ and outright, aiming at the preservation of the state, and 
less concerned with the virtue of monarch or subjects. Elizabethan counsellors were required 
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by the expectations of the time to adapt to the goals and vocabularies of Reason of State as its 
primary agents.     
Reason of State, as an idea, is notoriously difficult to pin down, which is why it seldom 
appears in scholarship on Elizabeth’s reign.39 ‘Reason of State’, put succinctly, refers to the 
prioritization of the good, or ‘interest’, of the state, as well as the means to procure that end. 
As Botero defines it, it is ‘the knowledge [notitia]’ of such means by which a state, a ‘firm rule 
over a people’, may be ‘found[ed], conserve[d] and expand[ed]’.40 Often it appears as the 
knowledge required to manage the state towards these ends in the absence of the laws and in 
extraordinary circumstances.41 It was this element especially which linked it to the role of the 
counsellor, who was often seen as the actor to provide guidance in circumstances which the 
laws did not cover, or in which they had to be contravened.42 In particular, this was often 
couched in the language of ‘necessity’ and ‘occasion’, the recognition that the good of the state 
required, in such emergency conditions, immoral or even unlawful action.43 It was the 
counsellors’ job to recognize these exceptional moments, and act accordingly.44  These ideas 
defined the discourse of counsel under Elizabeth, in ways hitherto little explored.   
From sixteenth-century accounts, we can pick out two distinct Reason of State 
traditions: ‘Machiavellian’ and ‘Jesuit’.45 The first develops from the spread of Machiavellian 
ideas from the 1530s onwards.46 Central to Machiavellianism was the dissociation of utile and 
honestum – profit and honesty, often thought of as ‘policy’ and religion.47 A Machiavellian 
account accepted that the good of the state (or the prince) might be achieved through immoral 
or irreligious means, overturning the Ciceronian acceptance that morality and expediency went 
hand-in-hand.48 For instance, in the 1571 Treatise of Treasons, ‘a Machiauellian State & 
Regime[n]t’ is ‘where Religion is put behind in the seco[n]d & last place: wher yt ciuil Policie... 
is preferred before it’.49 Botero agrees, suggesting that Machiavelli ‘bases his Reason of State 
on lack of conscience’.50  
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The second, ‘Jesuit’, tradition seeks to oppose this Machiavellian discourse, advancing 
a ‘true’ Reason of State, which re-establishes the relationship between utile and honestum – 
policy and religion – while retaining much of the vocabulary and framework of a Machiavellian 
account. This is the intention of the fallen Jesuit, Giovanni Botero, in the Della Ragione di 
Stato (1589), and is repeated in the work of the English priest and (after 1614) Jesuit, Thomas 
Fitzherbert, who seeks to compose ‘some discourse concerning the necessarie concurrence of 
the reason of state with conscience and religion’.51 We might also turn to Fitzherbert’s ‘friend 
and mentor’, and fellow Jesuit, Robert Persons (or Parsons), whose 1593 Newes from Spayne 
and Holland criticizes the ‘councelles’ of Lord Burghley for being lacking in ‘iustice or 
co[n]science’ as well as in ‘humane wisdome and pollycy set downe by Machauel him selfe’.52 
Persons demonstrates that it is ‘a great ouersight in reason of state’ for Elizabeth to have made 
‘so vniuersal a change of religion’ by once again rejecting the Catholic religion.53 For Persons, 
Reason of State would have been aligned with God’s will in steering Elizabeth to the restoration 
of the Catholic religion. Because they sought to oppose Machiavellian Reason of State in its 
own terms, these writers accepted some of its fundamental ideas. This significantly shifted 
expectations regarding how political counsel was given and received, and what it ought to 
contain. 
The phrase ‘Reason of State’ appears seldom in Elizabethan political writing, despite 
Botero’s assertions that Reason of State is ‘mention[ed] nearly every day’ in the ‘courts of 
kings and great princes’.54 Given its immoral and irreligious associations, we may not be 
surprised.55 There are notable examples, however, which run counter to the prominent 
suggestion that it only permeates English political discourse in the mid-seventeenth century.56 
In a letter ascribed to Francis Bacon from the 1580s, the author suggests that the queen ought 
to determine ‘in all reason of state’ what to do about the Catholics, who threaten her rule, noting 
he does not see how ‘either in conscience’ or ‘in policy’ she will be able to make them 
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content.57 The Privy Council itself, in 1601, judges a matter to do with the Lord Mayer 
‘according to the reason of state and good government’.58 In short, by the end of Elizabeth’s 
reign, Reason of State is present not only in published writings, such as those of Persons, but 
has entered into quotidian political parlance as well, albeit rarely.  
More important than the term, however, are vocabularies and modes of political 
thinking associated with this new political discourse. Central to both Machiavellian and Jesuit 
Reason of State traditions was the emphasis on ‘relations’ or (later) ‘observations’: accounts 
of the ‘situations’ and affairs of other states.59 Such information provides the foundation for 
the politic scheming essential to working out how to secure the interest of one’s own state. 
Botero’s Relationi Universali, first published two years after his Ragione (1591-96) was an 
almanac of sorts, detailing the state of universal relations between states. There was no 
contemporary English translation of the Ragione, but the Relationi went through seven print 
editions between 1601 and 1630, each time altered and updated to align with changing political 
realities and the interests of the translator.60  
Even long before Botero, counsellors inspired by Machiavelli had begun to compile 
precisely these sorts of accounts. For instance, William Thomas’s advice to Edward VI, 
composed sometime in late 1551, was heavily inspired by Machiavelli; when Edward can ‘not 
plaie the Lyon’ – i.e. to use overt force – Thomas tells him that ‘it [is] no shame to plaie the 
Foxe’ or, in other words, to ‘worke by policie’.61 ‘Policie’, Thomas suggests, ‘is no vice’ and 
is unavoidable in ‘these daies’ when princes commonly employ such tactics. In another short 
piece by Thomas, ‘My private opinion tooching your Ma[ies]ties outward affaires at this 
present’, he gives detailed accounts of England’s relations with various European nations, and 
the motives each nation has for various paths of action.62 Robert Beale composes a similar 
account in his Treatise of the Office of a Councellor and Principall Secretarie to her 
Ma[jes]tie, written in 1592. There, he recommends Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum 
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for understanding ‘the State of the whole Realme’ (though in it ‘ther be many defects’).63 This 
is not enough, however, and a secretary must also ‘obtaine by dilligent readinge and 
observac[i]on of the histories of all Countryes’ an understanding of the relationship between 
England and the nations with which it has dealings.64 In this, Beale is more detailed, because 
‘I would wish you to followe another course w[i]th them than hath beene of maie yeares 
heretofore used.’65 Some have even ‘despised’ this knowledge, so that the Queen is ‘not duelie 
informed how thinges passe, nor hath anye of her subiects so acquainted w[i]th forraine affaires 
as is fitt for her Ma[jes]tie’s service.’66 The remedy? The secretary ought to have on hand ‘your 
Italian Relationi’, Botero’s text, which ‘may stande you in some steede for the knowledge of 
forraigne Estates’.67  
Beale’s specific advice about affairs with other nations is rife with the language of 
Reason of State. In particular, Beale suggests – in reference to dealing with the Italians – ‘cum 
Cretensibus Cretisandum est’, a phrase that also appears in a letter by Burghley from 1593: 
‘cretisare cum cretensi’ or ‘to deceive among deceivers’, which he says is ‘allowable’.68 The 
phrase also appears in an earlier 1580 letter to Burghley from Thomas Radcliff, Earl of Sussex, 
who worries that the French ‘cretizare cum cretensibus’, assuming that the English are 
deceiving them. Like Thomas and others, Beale has accepted the necessity of occasional 
deception, to the end of preserving the state.69  
Whereas appearances of the phrase ‘Reason of State’ and references to Botero’s 
Relationi, or writings like it, are scattered, the language of ‘necessity’, ‘occasion’ and 
‘temporizing’ is ubiquitous. These ideas, it should be said, were not new in the mid-sixteenth 
century. The vocabulary of ‘occasion’ complete with its immoral and exceptional associations 
comes from the ancient concept, kairos, or ‘the opportune moment’, which had appeared in the 
works of various classical thinkers, including Plato, Isocrates and Plutarch, and was revived in 
the Renaissance.70 The idea that such opportune moments must not be ‘let slip’, or else the 
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state would face dangerous threats, appears in political discourse of the fifteenth century and 
early sixteenth centuries, but by the mid-sixteenth century had acquired an air of greater 
deception and urgency, as well as appearing more frequently. In 1549, under the reign of the 
young Edward VI, William Paget especially connected such language to the role of counsellors, 
telling Thomas Smith that ‘Wherefore whenne princes be in saden [sudden] heates, and 
specially without certaine ground, we Secretaries must temporise the matter wt termes 
convenient.’71 
By the reign of Elizabeth, this language was pervasive. John Challoner writes to 
William Cecil twice in November 1559, urging him to remind the queen not to lose the 
‘occasion’ and that ‘It is good to remember that occasion serves not alwaye’.72 It is important, 
these letters make clear, to take advantage of opportunity when England has it, before it shifts 
to England’s enemies; as Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick and Amias Poulet, ambassador to 
France, write to Robert Dudley and Cecil in 1563, ‘leaving the good occasion p[re]sently 
offered, [Elizabeth] wold seme to kepe peace towards theym who will not faile to make her as 
extreme… warre as they can[n] devise as sone as they shall se the tyme off [sic] advantage.’73 
Poulet writes again to Burghley in 1578, hoping that the queen is aware of this temporizing 
game: ‘I hope her ma[jes]tie is to well acquainted w[i]th the Spaniarde to be abused w[i]th his 
Rhethoricke, and yt behoveth us to knowe that the loss of a daye is of greate moment in these 
actions. The Spaniarde knoweth yt, and therefore sekyth to wynne tyme by all meanes possible, 
and when his turne is served, he maye p[er]chance turne his flatteries into threatenings.’74 
Elizabeth will never escape the ‘malice and cruelty’ of the Spanish unless she ‘make her profytt 
of gudde blessings, I meane [inserted: of] the tyme when it serveth, and of occasions when they 
are profered.’75  
There also exists, however, a recognition that these games of opportunity are not 
enough. In regards Elizabeth’s opposition to Anjou over the lordship of the Low Countries, in 
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which she had asked her ambassadors to use ‘delays’ against Anjou until English forces arrive, 
Thomas Wilson writes that ‘Temporysinge hath been thought heretofore good policie’, but 
‘There was never so da[n]gorouse a tyme as this is, and temporizinge wil no longer serue’.76 
Instead, he is glad to see that Elizabeth is now considering ‘preventi[n]g against da[n]ger to be 
feared’.77 In particular, this prevention needed to be taken against those who would seize their 
own opportunities against the English crown.  
This language of emergency and pre-emption is clearest in the discussion of what is to 
be done about Mary Queen of Scots. In 1572, reasons were laid out in the House of Commons 
why Elizabeth was ‘bound in Conscience to proceed with Severity’ against Mary, which urged 
Elizabeth that a new law would not be enough, as ‘no Law hath any force with her’ as she is 
‘fully minded to take her advantage upon any apt occasion offered.’78 The willingness to seize 
occasion, regardless of morality and law, means these are not enough to bind someone; extra-
legal measures must be embraced. In a 1587 document titled ‘A discourse plainlie proveinge 
that as well the sentence of death latelie given against that unfortunate ladie Marie late Queene 
of Scotts as also the execution of the same sentence were honourable just necessarie and 
lawfull’, the author stresses that the spread of the ‘disease’ presented by the threat of Mary 
became ‘dailie more and more desperate’ and so there could be no longer any ‘delay’.79 For 
Elizabeth’s part, the author suggests she wishes ‘the occasion had never bene given’ to 
overcome Mary, and that ‘the regarde of state’ (a rendering of Reason of State) ‘and regall 
administration were not so great and obligatory… as in troth they be’.80 Princes, he makes 
clear, follow different rules than do private individuals, for they are bound by ‘their office and 
dutie of administration’ and the ‘Case of the Commonwealth’, in which they are guided by ‘all 
the wiser Iudgements of the Realme and the three estates assembled in full Parliament’.81 Every 
other prince, he maintains would have done the same, with ‘the oportunitie so well serving for 
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that purpose’, ‘even when no necessitie of the state or p[er]ill of the Prince of that dominion 
inforced, as nowe it did’.82  
Elizabeth’s decision was ‘expedient in all good pollicy’ and her reputation would have 
suffered had she done otherwise, for ‘all great Princes and governors are then thought wisest 
and most worthie of their Administration when they be vigilant and lett not slipp any good and 
honest advantage offered them’.83 In fact, he goes on, Elizabeth, by ‘exacte pollicie’ might 
even be expected to seek the life of the young King James VI, but ‘as a most Christian and 
vertuous Princesse utterly detesteth all such manner of Pollicie, and houldeth it in great horror 
and abhomination and all those that would p[re]sume to give her any such advice.’84 
The author argues that Elizabeth did proceed according to the law, and with the consent 
of parliament, though also suggests that she acted according to the ‘universall Consent and 
uniformitie of mans opinion and will’, which ‘thoughe it be not properlie a iustifying lawe’ it 
is not ‘altogether not a lawe’, namely: ‘rather to kill than be killed’.85 And another, that ‘the 
greater good is p[re]ferred befor the smaller, the generall before the speciall and the Cases of 
necessitie before those that be ^not^ necessary.’86 In short, Elizabeth, the author maintains, did 
act according to the law and expectations of honour, but she also acted in line with the 
expectations of Reason of State; this alone would have been enough to justify her actions, and 
indeed, worse ones.  
The backdrop of Reason of State rendered Elizabeth’s perceived ability – already 
limited by gender – to judge good counsel from bad more suspect, and thus increased the 
apparent power of the counsellor to benefit or destroy the realm. In response, Elizabeth used 
delay as a political tool against the demands of her counsellors, whose emphasis on seizing 
occasion often proceeded from frustration at Elizabeth’s irresolution. In a political culture 
where her gender could give her the appearance of weakness in contrast to her male 




Elizabeth’s gender was certainly important in shaping the political culture of her reign, but 
there were other influences determining the nature of the discourse of counsel in the latter half 
of the sixteenth century. Reason of State introduced a new political language, as well as a new 
way of thinking about politics built on moral flexibility, the emphasis on inter-state relations 
and an awareness of opportunity, temporizing and necessity, even exceptionalism. This 
fundamentally altered the role of the counsellor and the content of political counsel in this 
period, with important implications for early modern political authority.  
England saw a shift in councilliar strategies not only because of the rule of one minor 
and two women but also due in part to continental influences. The analysis of Elizabethan 
counsel offers a contribution to existing literature, by showing that Reason of State 
vocabularies were pervasive in Elizabethan politics. By the end of the sixteenth century, 
counsel had shifted from a rhetorical practice aimed at the achievement of virtue, to apparently 
straightforward (though sometimes still deceptively rhetorical) practical advice regarding the 
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